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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀect of book versus fair value accounting on a
bank’s (re)investment behavior, risk of default, investment value, and the
need for regulation. Adopting the wide–spread view that fair value ac-
counting increases disclosure and reduces the degree of asymmetric infor-
mation, we show that fair value accounting increases the liquidity of ﬁnan-
cial assets. Consequently, it intensiﬁes risk shifting and, therefore, increases
the need for regulation and the risk of default. For highly leveraged in-
stitutions the increased risk shifting under fair value accounting outweighs
an underinvestment eﬀect of book value accounting and ultimately reduces
welfare.
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The current change from book value accounting, under which the balance sheet
lists ﬁnancial positions at initial costs, towards fair value accounting, under which
ﬁnancial instruments are listed at the present value of their expected cash ﬂows,
marks a fundamental change in accounting rules.1 The change is meant to improve
the informational position of capital markets and regulators. It is argued that
this reduction in the degree of asymmetric information leads to more market
discipline and thereby facilitates the regulation of banks.2 In contrast, this paper
argues that a reduction of asymmetric information between the capital market
and banks may actually intensify the bank’s risk shifting behavior and therefore
increases the need for regulation.3 Moreover, risk shifting increases the bank’s
probability of default and reduces its net present value.
Our argument is based on the reasoning that the well–known risk shifting
behavior of debt (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976) is more severe under fair value
accounting than under book value accounting. The reasoning is as follows: If a
move towards fair value accounting improves the informational position of the
market, then it reduces the asymmetry of information between the bank and
the market. This reduction in asymmetric information increases the liquidity of
assets and, thereby, enlarges the bank’s investment opportunities. In particular,
fair value accounting enables the bank to follow a riskier investment behavior.
Such behavior leads to a higher probability of default and a reduction in the
bank’s overall value.
The fact that fair value accounting leads to a higher liquidity of the bank’s
assets is due to Akerlof’s lemon problem: Under book value accounting the bank
possesses private information about the quality of its assets and the market can
1For more details see Financial Accounting Standards Board (1997) and Joint Working
Group of Standard Setters (2000). Enria et al. (2004) oﬀers a summary of the prevailing
arguments in favor and against fair value accounting.
2Although fair value accounting applies to all types of ﬁrms, it has an especially large impact
on banks, because the balance sheets of these ﬁnancial institutions are dominated by ﬁnancial
instruments. We therefore concentrate our analysis on banks.
3See Dewatripont and Tirole (1994, p.31) and Freixas and Rochet (1997, Ch. 9) for why
risk shifting behavior is one of the main rationales for regulating banks.
2therefore not distinguish between good and bad assets. Hence, it is willing to pay
at most an average price, which eﬀectively results into a discount for good assets.
The discount deters banks from selling high quality assets and, hence, decreases
the liquidity of such assets. Since fair value accounting reduces the asymmetric
information between the bank and the market, it increases the liquidity of high
quality assets.
We identify fair value accounting with a higher degree of disclosure. It reﬂects
the idea that fair value accounting can only improve the informational position
of outsiders if it leads to more disclosure of private information. This view is
consistent with that of the Joint Working Group of standard setters (JWG),
who deﬁne the fair value of a ﬁnancial instrument as the present value of its
expected cash ﬂows under all available information.4 We want to stress that we
do not investigate how accounting may achieve such disclosure.5 Rather, our
intention is to show that even if fair value lives up to its ideal of achieving full
transparency at zero costs, it increases rather than decreases tensions between
regulators and banks. In order to show this rigorously, we sidestep all disclosure
problems and take an idealized view of fair value accounting: fair value accounting
achieves full transparency. In contrast, book value accounting is, by assumption,
an intransparent situation in which the bank retains some private information.
Under these ideal circumstances we show that tensions between regulators and
banks are higher under fair value accounting. Our argument against fair value
accounting therefore does not depend on some form of transaction costs that
prevents a disclosure of private information and frustrates fair value accounting.
Since our paper assumes a direct relationship between accounting rules and
information structure, it distinguishes itself from other work that points to eco-
nomic drawbacks of fair value accounting.6 In particular, O’Hara (1993) focuses
4For a formal deﬁnition of fair value see for instance Draft Standard & Basis for Con-
clusions Section 1.8b of the JWG: http://www.standardsetter.de/drsc/docs/drafts/iasb/jwg-
paper conclusions.pdf.
5For theoretical work on how fair value accounting may increase transparency, see for in-
stance Barth and Landsman (1995) and Finnerty and Grant (2002).
6See Christensen and Demski (2002) for a theory of accounting based on the view that it
aﬀects the information structure.
3on the choice of maturity and demonstrates how fair value accounting distorts the
incentive of ﬁrms towards short–term assets. In contrast, Plantin et al. (2004)
show how marking–to–market accounting leads to an artiﬁcial volatility of mar-
ket prices.7 The volatility reduces the informativeness of prices, which leads to
economic ineﬃciencies. On a diﬀerent note Freixas and Tsomocos (2004) demon-
strate that the increased volatility of fair value accounting frustrates the bank’s
economic role of intertemporal smoothing. For smoothing reasons, book value
accounting may therefore be preferred.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the frame-
work in which we demonstrate our results formally. In Section 3 we abstract from
the issue of moral hazard and study the behavior of a non–leveraged “bank”. We
show that in this case fair value accounting is welfare improving. It raises the
bank’s value, because it solves an underinvestment problem that occurs under
book value accounting. Section 4 builds on the analysis of Section 3 and focuses
on the moral hazard problem of a leveraged bank. It shows that the moral hazard
problem is more severe under fair value accounting. More speciﬁcally, for highly
leveraged banks this negative eﬀect of fair value accounting outweighs the positive
eﬀect identiﬁed in Section 3. To illustrate our formal results Section 5 presents
a numerical example. Section 6 argues that the case for fair value accounting is
even weaker when there is no deposit insurance. Section 7 concludes. All formal
proofs are relegated to the appendix
2 The Framework
Consider a banking supervisor, S, who in period t = 0 must decide whether
a bank, B, has to use book value accounting (b), or fair value accounting (f),
i.e. S chooses a ∈ {b,f}. Under book value accounting assets are recorded at
their initial value of purchase and are completely uninformative. In contrast, if
fair value accounting is chosen, the bank’s book lists assets according to their
fair value, i.e., the present value of the expected cash ﬂows under all available
7As we emphasize in the conclusion and noted already by O’Hara (1993), in markets with
asymmetric information there exists an important diﬀerence between fair value accounting and
marking–to–market accounting.
4information. We take the ideal case of fair value accounting that all valuation
problems, including possible manipulation of information, are solved. That is,
under fair value accounting the bank reveals all its private information so that
the asymmetry of information between the bank and other parties is completely
resolved.8 Eﬀectively, the accounting method determines the information struc-
ture between the bank and other parties. Under book value accounting the bank
is better informed about the prospects of its assets, whereas under fair value
accounting this information is shared with all other participants.
The bank operates for two consecutive periods t = 1,2. In period t = 1 the
bank may invest in project 1, which requires a ﬁxed amount of size I1 = 1.9
The project matures after period t = 2. Initially, it is known that the project is
successful with probability p1, in which case it yields a cash ﬂow of h1. A failure
of the project occurs with probability 1−p1 and leads to a cash ﬂow of l = 0. To
make the initial investment non–trivial, we assume that the probability of success
is high enough to recoup the initial investment of I1 = 1, i.e., h1 > 1/p1.
At the beginning of period t = 2 the bank has a possibility to invest in a
second project, which also matures at the end of period t = 2. For convenience
we assume that this project is scalable and the bank may invest any amount
I2 > 0. The project is successful with probability j in which case it yields a
cashﬂow of h2 per invested amount, where h2 > h1. If the project fails, which
occurs with probability 1 − j, it yields zero. In period t = 0 it is only known
that the probability of success j is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Importantly,
we assume that the bank cannot raise new capital to invest in project 2. That is,
if the bank wants to invest in project 2, it has to sell (part of its) ﬁrst project in
a competitive market.10
8As discussed in the introduction, we do not explain how this diﬀerence between book and
fair value comes about. Rather we simply follow the prevailing view that fair value increases
transparency. This eﬀectively implies that fair value accounting tends to resolve asymmetric
information. We comment on this prevailing view in the ﬁnal section.
9We view the bank’s investment as an initially unmarketable bank loan to which only the
bank has access due to its superior screening possibilities.
10It is exactly this assumption which creates a role for the liquidity of the bank’s initial assets.
An alternative interpretation is that the bank securitizes the loan. Under this interpretation
5The bank ﬁnances its initial investment I1 = 1 through private capital e and
deposits d, i.e., e + d = 1. We assume that depositors are protected by deposit
insurance. This assumption is not crucial.11 It simpliﬁes the exposition and is
relaxed in Section 6. Normalizing the market’s interest rates to zero, deposit
insurance implies that depositors will demand a return that matches their initial
deposit d.
After investing the bank learns some private information i ∈ {g,b} about
project 1. With probability q the information is good which means that the
probability of success of project 1 rises from p1 to pg. If, on the other hand, the
bank receives bad information, which occurs with probability 1−q, the probability
of success of project 1 reduces to pb, where pg > p1 > pb.12 Hence, as of this stage
there exist two types of banks: Good banks that received good information and
hold a project which succeeds with probability pg and bad banks which hold a
project that succeeds with the lower probability pb.
At the end of period t = 1 the bank publishes its accounts according to the
accounting rule set in period t = 0. That is, if the bank is required to use fair
value accounting, a good bank’s capital is listed as ef
g = pgh1 − d, whereas a bad
bank’s statement displays e
f




participants can deduce the bank’s type from its accounts. If the bank uses book
value accounting, its accounts show eb = 1−d and are independent of the bank’s
type so that this remains private information.
At the beginning of period t = 2 the bank learns the probability of success,
j, of the second project and must decide whether it wants to ﬁnance it. As
mentioned, the investment is only possible if the bank decides to sell (part of)
its ﬁrst project. Since the second project is fully scalable, it can invest the entire
the accounting method aﬀects the informational position of the institution that securitizes the
loan and therefore the revenue from securitization.
11John et al. (1991) explain that the risk shifting eﬀect does not depend on whether the bank
pays the fair price of the deposit insurance, but on the fact that its price is not contingent on
the bank’s behavior. Hence, the question of a fair price of the deposit insurance is not directly
related to our concerns and we abstract from it (see also Chan et. al. (1992) and Freixas and
Rochet (1997, p. 266–272)).











B sells a share of project 1 at V
and reinvests V in project 2
Projects mature
Figure 1: Time line
proceeds V into the second project. In this case, I2 = V . Clearly, the bank will
only use this reinvestment opportunity, if it expects to gain from it. That is, only
if V and j are large enough.
At the end of period 2 both projects mature and the bank receives the proceeds
r from its investments. It reimburses from these proceeds the depositors for their
share d. If r < d the deposit insurance reimburses the depositors for a share d−r.
Figure 1 summarizes the diﬀerent stages in a time line.
3 All Equity
In order to develop some intuition about the model we ﬁrst investigate the bank’s
investment behavior when it is fully funded by equity. That is, we analyze the
bank’s behavior for d = 0. In this case there does not exist a moral hazard
problem concerning the bank’s investment’s behavior. This section shows that
fair value accounting has a positive eﬀect, because it resolves an underinvestment
eﬀect that occurs under book value accounting.
We may solve the model backwards. In period t = 2 the bank observes the
probability of success j and has to decide whether to sell its stake in the ﬁrst
project and to reinvest it in the second project. This is proﬁtable if the expected
proﬁt of the new project is larger than the expected proﬁt of the old project.
That is, given the bank’s information i ∈ {b,g} and its ability to sell its ﬁrst
project at a price V a swap of projects is proﬁtable if
jV h2 ≥ pih1.
7Clearly, the proceeds V of the sell–oﬀ play a crucial role in the bank’s reinvestment
decision.
Given that the regulator required the bank to use fair value accounting, there
does not exist any asymmetry of information between the bank and capital mar-
kets. More speciﬁcally, the bank’s information i ∈ {b,g} about whether the ﬁrst
project is a good or a bad project is shared with the market. Hence, a bank of
type i ∈ {b,g} is able to sell its ﬁrst project at the fair price Vi = pih1. It follows
that the bank will swap projects if and only if the probability of success j exceeds











Under book value accounting the sale of the old project diﬀers. In this case,
the bank’s balance sheets are uninformative about the quality of the ﬁrst project
and the capital market cannot deduce its actual value. In contrast to an ac-
counting at fair value, the market cannot make its price V contingent on the
bank’s information i. Instead, it can only oﬀer a uniform, average price that is
consistent with its belief about the oﬀered quality. Hence, as in Akerlof (1970)’s
lemon’s problem good projects will be sold at a discount. If this discount is too
large, adverse selection occurs in that only projects with the low valuation pbh1
are oﬀered to the market:
Proposition 1 If pbh2 < pg, there exists a market equilibrium in which only a
bank holding a bad project sells its project at a market price V = pbh1.
Indeed, given that the market oﬀers to buy projects at a price V = pbh1, the
discount for a good project is (pg −pb)h1. That is, if pbh2 < pg then even a bank
which is sure that the second project succeeds (j = 1) is unwilling to sell the ﬁrst
project to invest in the second one.13 In fact, the critical probability, jb
g, that
13Proposition 1 only shows the existence of the equilibrium and not uniqueness. It may,
however, be shown that an equilibrium in which banks that hold a good investment sell their
project does not exist if, quite intuitively, h2 is small enough or, more precisely, if pg/pb >
(2
√
h2 + h2 − 1)/(2
√
h2 − h2 + 1).










In the remainder of this paper we assume pbh2 < pg and focus on the equilibrium
of Proposition 1.14
Consequently, under book value accounting only a bad bank would want to
reinvest. In fact, it will do so exactly when jpbh1h2 exceeds pbh1. That is,







The cut–oﬀ values ja
i describe the reinvestment behavior of the diﬀerent banks
i ∈ {g,b} under the two accounting rules a ∈ {b,f}. Since, under book value
accounting, a good bank does not reinvest even for j > pg we arrive at our ﬁrst
result:
Proposition 2 Book value accounting leads to an underinvestment by the bank
and a welfare loss as compared to fair value accounting.
Apart from the inﬂuence on investment behavior ﬁnancial regulators will be
especially interested in the bank’s default probabilities under the two alternative
accounting schemes. We say that the bank defaults when its projects fail. The
probability of default therefore coincides with the probability that the returns
are zero. Thus, we may identify the eﬀect of accounting rules on the default
probability by considering the diﬀerent cash ﬂow distributions.
Figure 2 displays the overall cashﬂow distribution under fair value accounting.





























































14Qualitative results remain unchanged, but become less tractable, for pbh2 > pg. In this
case a good bank may sell its ﬁrst project, but will still receive a discount. This discount causes
a diﬀerence between jb
g and jf
g on which all our results ultimately depend.
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Figure 2: Cashﬂow distribution under fair value accounting
Similarly, Figure 3 represents the probability distribution of cashﬂows under
book value accounting. The corresponding probability of default, kb, may be
calculated as
k




























Proposition 3 The probability of default under book value accounting is larger
than under fair value accounting if and only if 1 − pg > pg − jf
g.
Proposition 3 shows that the accounting method has an ambiguous eﬀect on
the bank’s default probability. Hence, fair value accounting does not automat-
ically lead to a lower probability of default. The intuition behind this result is
best understood by considering Figure 4, which depicts the probability distribu-
tion of default of a good bank. For the range [0,jf
g] there is no diﬀerence, because
regardless of the accounting method, the bank does not swap investment projects
and the probability of default is simply 1 − pg. But at jf
g a good bank using fair
value accounting would sell its ﬁrst investment to invest in the second one. Since
jf
g < pg the probability of default rises from 1−pg to 1−jf
g as compared to a good
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Figure 3: Cashﬂow distribution under book value accounting
bank that, due to book value accounting, never reinvests. On the other hand,
for values of j exceeding pg the reinvestment decision under fair value account-
ing actually lowers the probability of default. Triangle A displays the increased
probability of default, while triangle B represents the decreased probability of




b ), the diﬀerence of the two areas reﬂects the diﬀerence in the
two probabilities. Due to the uniform distribution of j, the diﬀerence translates
to 1 − pg > pg − jf
g as stated in Proposition 3.
4 Deposits and Equity
In this section we consider a more typical bank that is ﬁnanced by deposits rather
than equity alone. This leads to problems of moral hazard in the bank’s invest-
ment behavior, because the bank will take decisions that maximize the payoﬀ of
the owners, i.e., equity holders, and neglect the eﬀect on depositors.15 Jensen
and Meckling (1976) argue that moral hazard leads to a riskier investment be-
havior and, thereby, leads to an important rationale for a regulation of banks.
This section shows that the negative risk shifting eﬀect may outweigh the posi-
15We abstract from additional problems of moral hazard between the bank’s owners and its
management.
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Figure 4: Default probability distribution of a good bank
tive eﬀect identiﬁed in the previous section that fair value accounting solves an
underinvestment problem.
A funding by deposits changes the bank’s payoﬀ function as compared to the
previous section. More precisely, given the bank’s deposits d and a ﬁnal cash ﬂow
of r, the bank receives an amount max{0,r − d}.
Again we proceed by computing the critical success probabilities to determine
the bank’s investment behavior. Under fair value accounting the capital market
can deduce the bank’s information i ∈ {g,b} from its accounts and the bank is
able to sell its assets at the fair price Vi = pih1. To a good bank, a successful
reinvestment therefore yields pgh1h2 − d > 0. We conclude that the expected
payoﬀ from switching the investment is j(pgh1h2 − d), whereas the expected
payoﬀ from holding onto the initial investment is pg(h1 − d) > 0. Reﬂecting the
moral hazard eﬀect of debt, the critical success probability at which a bank wants
to reinvest is now a function of the deposits d. In particular, a bank using fair
value accounting and holding a good investment reinvests only if the probability







Note that for any debt level d ∈ (0,1) the threshold value jf
g(d) is smaller than
1.16
In contrast, a bank holding a bad project can sell its ﬁrst investment only
at the lower price pbh1. The expected payoﬀ from switching the investment is
j(pbh1h2−d), whereas the expected payoﬀ from holding onto the initial investment
is pb(h1−d). The truncated threshold value j
f














The truncation at ˜ d reﬂects the fact that for larger debt levels a bad bank will
not even want to reinvest when the probability of success, j, is one.
We next turn to the behavior under book value accounting. First, we argue
that Proposition 1 remains valid; due to the adverse selection problem, the market
will value assets at the lower price pbh1. Indeed, if the resale value of the asset
is V = pbh1, the expected payoﬀ from switching the investment is j(pbh1h2 − d).
To a good bank the expected payoﬀ from holding onto the initial investment is
pg(h1−d). But since pg > pbh2 it follows that pbh1hd−d < pgh1 −d < pg(h1−d)
so that, even for a success probability of j = 1, a good bank will not want to
swap investments. A rational market, which anticipates that a good bank will
never oﬀer its investment for sale, will correctly price any asset at V = pbh1.
Thus we conclude that, under book value accounting, the price V = pbh1 is still
an equilibrium price. Proposition 1 remains valid also with debt ﬁnance: good





16This follows because, due to d(1 − pg) < 1 − pg < 1 − 1/h2 = (h2 − 1)/h2 < h2 − 1 <
h1pg(h2 − 1), the numerator in (1) is smaller than the denominator.
13Under book value accounting the resale value V equals pbh1, which, to a bad
bank, is equivalent to its resale value under fair value accounting. As a result,




Again, one may calculate the probabilities of default under fair value account-



























whilst the default probability, kb(d), under book value accounting equals
k













A comparison of the default probabilities yields the following insight.
Proposition 4 The probability of default increases with the size of deposits d.
The increase is greater under fair value accounting than under book value ac-
counting.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition is the well–known risk shifting eﬀect due
to debt ﬁnancing (e.g. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Barnea et al. (1985))
and needs little discussion. More interestingly, the second part of the proposition
reveals that the size of the increase depends on the accounting method. In order to
understand why fair value accounting leads to a sharper increase in the probability
of default it is helpful to consider the eﬀect of depositors on bad and good banks
separately.
First, consider a bank holding a bad project at the end of period t = 1. In-
dependent of the accounting method a ∈ {f,b}, deposits increase the threshold
ja
b(d) at which the bad bank is willing to swap investments. This increase rep-
resents the risk shifting eﬀect. Since, as illustrated in Figure 5, it holds ja
b > pb,
it follows that the probability of default increases by an area A.17 We empha-
size that the magnitude of the increase does not depend on the accounting rule
a ∈ {b,f}. I.e., the risk shifting eﬀect of deposits on bad banks is identical under
fair value and book value accounting.
17The inequality ja
b > pb follows, due to 1 > pg > pbh2, from ja
b ≡ 1/h2 = pb/(h2pb) >
pb/pg > pb.
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Figure 5: Default probability of bad banks
For good banks, however, the occurrence of risk shifting does depend on the
accounting method. A good bank using book value accounting will, due to the
lemon’s problem, never sell its investment to reinvest. Hence, its (non)reinvestment
behavior is independent of the size of the deposits d and, for good banks, deposits
do not lead to risk shifting.
In contrast, risk shifting does arise under fair value accounting. As illustrated
in Figure 6, deposits induce good banks to reinvest at a smaller probability of
success, jf
g(d) < jf
g. But since, from a default perspective, a good bank with-
out any deposits switches already too soon (jf
g < pg), the even lower threshold
jf
g(d) implies that under fair value accounting deposits increase the probability
of default.18 That is, fair value accounting leads to an increase for both types of
banks, whereas book value accounting only increases the probability of default of
bad banks. This explains why the default probability rises faster under fair value
accounting.
According to Proposition 3 fair value accounting leads to a lower probability
of default if 1 − pg > pg − jf
g. Yet, since the threshold jf
g decreases with the
18Due to pgh2 > pgh1 > 1 it holds jf
g ≡ 1/h2 = pg/(h2pg) < pg.
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Figure 6: Default probability of good banks
size of deposits d, one may ﬁnd a cut–oﬀ value ¯ d > 0 at which the inequality
becomes violated. Fair value accounting leads to a larger probability of default
than book value accounting for any debt level that exceeds ¯ d. Figure 6 illustrates
this graphically. The probability of default under fair value accounting is smaller
than under book value accounting if and only if the distance between pg and jf
g(d)
is smaller than the diﬀerence 1−pg. The following proposition derives the cut–oﬀ
value explicitly.
Proposition 5 Fair value accounting leads to a larger probability of default than
book value accounting whenever the deposits d exceed the threshold ¯ d, where
¯ d ≡
pgh1(1 + h2 − 2pgh2)
1 − pg
.
Proposition 5 implies that for high leveraged banks fair value accounting leads
to a higher probability of default than book value accounting. The result is a
direct consequence of the second part of Proposition 4: The moral hazard eﬀect
induces banks to make riskier investments, i.e., accept higher probabilities of
16default. Since the moral hazard eﬀect is stronger for fair value accounting, the
probability of default increases faster than under book value accounting.
Proposition 2 showed that fair value accounting solves an underinvestment
problem and, therefore, increases overall social welfare. Yet, risk shifting leads to
an investment behavior that reduces welfare. Hence, the fact that risk shifting
is stronger under fair value accounting indicates that for high levels of deposits
fair value accounting may lead to lower social welfare despite its solution to the
underinvestment problem. To investigate whether the moral hazard eﬀect may
indeed outweigh the underinvestment eﬀect, we calculate the expected ex ante
value of the investment under the diﬀerent accounting rules. Under fair value

































Book value accounting yields a value
PV
















A comparison of the two values reveals the following result.
Proposition 6 The present value of the investment decreases with debt d. The
decrease is larger under fair value accounting than under book value accounting.
The investment’s value under fair value accounting is greater than under book
value accounting if and only if
d < ˆ d ≡
pgh1h2(h2 − 1)
h2(1 + pg) − 2
.
The proposition shows that the presence of debt may indeed reverse the beneﬁ-
cial eﬀect of fair value accounting that was obtained in Proposition 2. Proposition
6 calculates the exact cut–oﬀ value ˆ d at which the negative risk shifting and the
positive investment eﬀect are balanced. From a welfare point of view, book value
accounting is preferred to fair value accounting if deposits exceed ˆ d.
17kf(d)
kb(d)






PV b(d) PV b(0)
PV f(0)
˜ d ˆ d d
PV
Ex ante present values
Figure 7: A numerical example.
5 A numerical example
This section illustrates our results in a numerical example. In this example the
rate of return on the ﬁrst project is 8%, whereas the rate of return of the sec-
ond project is 9%. Good projects fail only with a probability of 5%, whereas
bad projects fail with a probability of 15%. The likelihood of a good project is
80%. These parameter values satisfy the restrictions of the model and enable
us to illustrate all the salient features of our model. Figure 7 illustrates the re-
sults graphically, while Table 1 reports the actual values of the most important
variables for some critical debt levels d.
The example conﬁrms our results that, without debt ﬁnancing, fair value
accounting induces an investment behavior that yields a higher ex ante present
value: PV f(0) > PV b(0). This reﬂects the positive eﬀect of fair value accounting
that it solves an underinvestment problem. In addition, the probability of default
is, in our example, smaller under fair value accounting when there is no debt
ﬁnancing: kf(0) > kb(0).
Figure 7 illustrates how the default probability rises, as the debt level in-
creases; both curves kf(d) and kb(d) are increasing. The important insight, how-
ever, is that the curve under fair value accounting, kf(d), is steeper than the curve
18Example: q=0.8,pg =.95,h1=1.08,h2=1.09,pb=.85,
d=0 d = ¯ d ≈ 0.39 d = ˜ d ≈ 0.55 d = ˆ d ≈ 0.8 d = 0.95
jf
g 0.91743 0.9 0.8858 0.83486 0.73363
j
f
b 0.91743 0.96048 1 1 1
jb
g 1 1 1 1 1
jb
b 0.91743 0.96048 1 1 1
kf 0.06763 0.06897 0.07065 0.07430 0.08773
kb 0.06821 0.06897 0.07 0.07 0.07
PV f 1.00813 1.00781 1.007 1.0044 0.9994
PV b 1.00508 1.0049 1.0044 1.0044 1.0044
Table 1: The numerical example with deposit insurance.
under book value accounting, kb(d). Hence, even though the default probability
without debt ﬁnancing is smaller under fair value accounting, we ﬁnd a critical
value ¯ d above which the curve kf(d) exceeds the curve kb(d); the default probabil-
ity is smaller for book value accounting. From Table 1 one may learn that this is
uniquely due to a diﬀerent behavior of good banks under the diﬀerent accounting
rules. Under fair value accounting good banks already switch investments when
the success probability of the second project exceeds jf
g(¯ d) = 90%. From an eﬃ-
ciency point of view, however, the optimal switching point is jf
g(0) ≈ 91.7%. Due
to the risk shifting eﬀect of debt ﬁnancing, good banks switch too early, thereby
raising the default probability. The table shows how this risk shifting eﬀect inten-
siﬁes as debt rises, exacerbating the downward distortion of the critical threshold
jf
g further. This does not occur under book value accounting, where, due to the
lemon’s eﬀect, good banks never switch investments, jb
g(d) = 1. Risk shifting
does occur for bad banks, but its magnitude is independent of the accounting
rule, j
f
b (d) = jb
b(d).
A further critical debt level is d = ˜ d, where the risk shifting eﬀect on bad banks
becomes so strong, that it keeps also these banks from switching investments:
j
f
b (˜ d) = jb
b(˜ d) = 1. Hence, under book value accounting, neither the good banks
nor the bad banks will switch investments. As a consequence, the expected
present value of the overall investment coincides with the expected present value
19of the ﬁrst project and equals 1.0044. This is illustrated in Figure 7, where the
curves kb(d) and PV b(d) remain ﬂat from ˜ d onwards. In contrast, the curve
PV f(d) decreases further, because under fair value accounting the risk shifting
eﬀect distorts the behavior of good banks further and further. We ﬁnd that as of
d = ˆ d the ex ante expected present value of investment behavior is lower under
fair value accounting. Note that at d = 0.95 the present value has dropped below
1. Hence, given the initial investment outlay I = 1, the net present value of the
bank’s investment behavior is actually negative.
6 No deposit insurance
We analyzed risk taking behavior under the assumption that depositors were
protected by deposit insurance. We made this assumption for three reasons.
First, our results do not depend on the presence of deposit insurance; deposit
insurance actually mitigates the underlying problem. Second, the assumption is
more realistic, because in practise most depositors are indeed protected by deposit
insurance. Third, without deposit insurance the analysis is less tractable. This
section underpins our ﬁrst claim that deposit insurance actually mitigates the
problem. In line with John et al. (1991), a removal of deposit insurance does not
alleviate the risk shifting problem, because depositors are unable to condition
their return on the bank’s investment behavior. When depositors demand a
ﬁxed rate of return that, in equilibrium, represents a fair premium, then, from
the bank’s perspective, this fair premium is simply equivalent to a larger share
of deposits. As a consequence, uninsured deposits exacerbate risk shifting and
fair value accounting becomes even less attractive. This section conﬁrms this
argument.
Without deposit insurance, depositors demand a positive interest rate in order
to be compensated for the possibility of default. In particular, a depositor, who
expects a probability of default of ke, will demand an interest of at least ke/(1−
ke). Hence, if the bank wants to take on deposits d > 0, it must promise a payout
of d/(1 − ke) to depositors. Eﬀectively, the depositors’ compensation for risk
taking raises the cost of deposits by a factor 1/(1 − ke). Consequently, we may
repeat the analysis without deposit insurance by substituting d/(1 − ke) for d.
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In a rational expectation equilibrium, the depositor’s expectations ke are con-
ﬁrmed. This means that, under fair value accounting, the equilibrium probability
of default k∗




































Likewise, the equilibrium probability of default under book value accounting,
k∗
b(d), follows from (4) and satisﬁes
k
∗

















These equilibrium conditions yield polynomials of the ﬁfth order and cannot
be solved analytically.19 However, due to the increased risk shifting eﬀect it
follows that the equilibrium default probabilities must be at least as large as with
deposit insurance. To see this, note that both the probability of default and
the present value of investment behavior depend on the depositors’ demanded
return ke only indirectly in that it aﬀects the thresholds jf
g, j
f
b , and jb
b. The
distortions of these thresholds increase with the eﬀective debt level d/(1 − ke).
Hence, if depositors expect a positive probability of default, ke > 0, and demand
a fair compensation, then the thresholds become more distorted than when the
depositors do not ask for risk adjusted compensation.
For our numerical example in Section 5 Table 2 reports the relevant variables
without deposit insurance. A comparison to Table 1 conﬁrms that fair value
19In addition, we cannot guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. E.g., Table 2 shows that
for d = 0.95 there exists no (pure strategy) equilibrium in our numerical example.
21Example: q=0.8,pg=.95,h1=1.08,h2=1.09,pb=.85,
d=0 d = ¯ d ≈ 0.39 d = ˜ d ≈ 0.55 d = ˆ d ≈ 0.8 d = .95
jf
g 0.91743 0.89793 0.88069 0.80367 —
j
f
b 0.91743 0.966 1 1 —
jb
g 1 1 1 1 —
jb
b 0.91743 0.966 1 1 —
k∗
f 0.06763 0.06918 0.07092 0.07757 —
k∗
b 0.06821 0.0691 0.07 0.07 —
PV ∗
f 1.00813 1.00773 1.00685 1.00166 —
PV ∗
b 1.00508 1.00485 1.0044 1.0044 —
Table 2: The numerical example without deposit insurance.
accounting fares worse without deposit insurance. This becomes especially clear
when comparing the defaults probabilities for the debt level ¯ d. With deposit
insurance, the debt level ¯ d yields equal probabilities, kf = kb, whilst without
deposit insurance fair value accounting yields a larger probability of default in
equilibrium, k∗
f > k∗
b. In addition at a debt level ˆ d the present values are equal
with deposit insurance, PV f = PV b, whereas the present value under fair value
accounting is smaller without deposit insurance, PV ∗
f < PV ∗
b . This conﬁrms that
deposit insurance skews results in favor of fair value accounting; without deposit
insurance the case against fair value accounting becomes even stronger.
7 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper shows that the risk shifting eﬀect of debt is more severe under fair
value accounting than under book value accounting. The driving forces that lead
to this conclusion are twofold: 1) the fact that fair value accounting leads to
a better informed market than book value accounting and 2) that in a better
informed market a bank’s assets are more liquid. From these two facts alone it
follows that fair value accounting raises the bank’s investment opportunities and
leads to riskier investments. This observation has two important consequences
for leveraged banks. First, default probabilities will be higher and, second, the
22bank’s overall value will be lower under fair value accounting. Moreover, since the
moral hazard eﬀect constitutes an important rationale for a regulation of banks,
the need of regulation is larger under fair value accounting.
We did not analyze the question how this additional regulation should look
like. An interesting solution in the context of our model is to let the accounting
rule depend on the debt level d. In particular, the regulator could specify that
the bank should use fair value accounting when d ≤ ¯ d and book value accounting
otherwise. An obvious disadvantage of this sophisticated accounting rule is that
it requires a well–informed regulator who has enough information to calculate the
cut oﬀ value ¯ d in a satisfactory way.
To concentrate on the liquidity eﬀect, we assumed that the bank had to sell
(or securize) its assets if it wanted to beneﬁt from a later investment opportu-
nity. In particular, it could not raise capital in other ways such as issuing new
equity or additional debt. However, if such reﬁnancing is easier under symmetric
information, then our insights also obtain with diﬀerent modes of reﬁnancing.
Myers and Majluf (1984), for example, show that a ﬁrm will be better at raising
new capital if there is less asymmetric information concerning its assets. Hence,
also in this case fair value accounting exacerbates problems of moral hazard and
increases tensions between regulator and bank increase.
Finally, we want to address our assumption that fair value accounting reduces
asymmetries of information. The assumption captures the prevalent view that fair
value accounting increases transparency. Given this view we identiﬁed the eﬀects
on the investment behavior of banks. However, a crucial question is, of course,
how this change of the information structure comes about. We want to stress that
simply marking assets to market does not by itself reduce asymmetric information.
Already O’Hara (p.60, 1993) raised this issue by pointing to the lemon’s problem.
Indeed, under asymmetric information an uninformed market prices the asset
at pbh1. Hence, under marking–to–market accounting the bank’s books would,
irrespective of the asset’s actual quality, list the asset at pbh1. Both good and
bad assets are listed at the same price and outsiders cannot learn the asset’s true
quality from looking in the books. We conclude that marking–to–market by itself
does not reveal any information. Increased transparency of fair value accounting
23may only come about through an honest reporting of private information by
the bank. In this respect Freixas and Tsomocos (p.2, 2004) argue that ”the
prevailing view is that suﬃciently high penalties would give the management the
right incentives to report the true market values.” Clearly, this somewhat naive
view may represent further objections to fair value accounting.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: To check existence, we ﬁrst show that at a price
V = pbh1 a bank with a good project does not want to sell its ﬁrst project and
reinvest. The payoﬀ from holding on to the ﬁrst project is pgh1. Selling the ﬁrst
project at the price V = pbh1 and reinvesting it in project 2 yields at most pbh1h2.
Due to assumption 1 this is strictly less so that a bank holding a good project
does not want to sell it at a price V = pbh1. Moreover, a bad bank reinvests
for j close enough to one, as, due to h2 > 1, it holds pbh1h2 > pbh1. Hence, at
a price V = pbh1 only banks with bad projects who observe a high j will oﬀer
their project to the market. Finally, in equilibrium the market expectations are
correct, i.e. it is aware that only bad project are oﬀered. With these rational
expectations the market is willing to pay at most V = pbh1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Given its reinvestment behavior the present value at























































[jh2 − 1]dj > 0.
Q.E.D.
24Proof of Proposition 3: Due to j
f
b = jb
b it follows that kb > kf if and only
if (1 − pg) > jf
g(1 − pg) + 1
2(1 − jf
g)2. Due to pgh1 > 1 and h2 > h1 it follows
pg > 1/h2 and, hence, 1 = jf
gh2 > jf
g/pg. This implies jf
g < pg. Therefore,
it holds for j ∈ [jf
g,pg) that 1 − j > 1 − pg. Hence, switching investments for
j ∈ [jf
g,pg) increases the probability of default. As the switch occurs only under
fair value accounting, the probability of default for j ∈ [jf
g,pg) is larger under fair
value accounting than under book value accounting. For j ∈ [pg,1] the opposite
holds, as it implies 1 − j ≤ 1 − pg. Due to the uniform distribution of j it then
follows that kb > kf if and only if 1 − pg > pg − jf
g. Q.E.D.
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where the inequality holds due to h1h2pg > h1h2pb > d. Diﬀerentiating (4) with






b(h2pb − 1)2(1 − q)
(h1h2pb − d)3 > 0,












(h1h2pb − d)3 ,
which is positive due to h1h2pg > h1h2pb > d. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Solving kf(¯ d) = kb(¯ d) as deﬁned by (3) and (4) with
respect to ¯ d yields
¯ d =
pgh1(1 + h2 − 2pgh2)
1 − pg
.
Proposition 5 shows that kf(d) increases faster than kb(d) such that for d > ¯ d it
follows kf(d) > kb(d) and kf(d) < kb(d) for d < ¯ d. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: Follows directly from solving PV f(d) < PV b(d).
Q.E.D.
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